India's stand on maritime rights under UNCLOS
India’s relationship with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is central to its claim to maritime rights. Having signed the 1982 convention and ratified it in 1995, New Delhi accepts a framework that balances coastal-state authority with freedoms of navigation on the high seas.
For Australia, the same framework is equally familiar. Canberra is a party to UNCLOS, protects a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, and relies on negotiated maritime boundaries as well as open navigation routes through the Indo-Pacific.
The comparison matters because the Indian Ocean is now a zone of overlapping commercial, strategic and ecological interests. Both countries face pressure to protect fishers, ports, offshore resources and marine ecosystems while keeping commerce moving.
A negotiated balance at sea
UNCLOS permits a coastal state to establish a territorial sea of up to 12 nautical miles, an exclusive economic zone extending to 200 nautical miles, and rights over its continental shelf. Navigation freedoms remain important, including those for ships and aircraft over exclusive economic zones and through internationally recognised straits.
India treats these entitlements as settled elements of international law. It seeks to prevent unilateral restrictions on fishing, surveying, shipping or resource activity inside its exclusive economic zone, while retaining the sovereign rights that enable it to govern offshore energy, ports and marine research.
Australia applies the same maritime geometry, including claims associated with its mainland, islands and external territories. Its principal differences concern geography, institutional history and regional priorities, rather than rejection of UNCLOS as the governing legal framework.
Why India's maritime position matters
India’s position extends beyond symbolic sovereignty. Its long coastline supports the ports of Chennai, Mumbai, Kolkata, Visakhapatnam and Paradip, along with fisheries and coastal communities dependent on access to nearby waters. Maritime law therefore influences economic resilience, food security and the country’s ability to resist coercive pressure.
The Foundation’s account of nationalist economic arguments illustrates how control over productive coastal assets and strategic infrastructure can support economic sovereignty. When translated into maritime policy, that approach links legal rights to port capacity, resilient supply chains, offshore resources and secure access to the Indian Ocean.
Comparing Indian and Australian interests
A side-by-side assessment shows substantial agreement on maritime law, followed by different strategic concerns.
| Issue | India | Australia | Shared interest |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legal framework | Ratified UNCLOS in 1995 | Party to UNCLOS since 1994 | Stable rules accepted by major maritime powers |
| Maritime zones | Territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental-shelf rights | Similar zones around the mainland, islands and territories | Protection of resource rights without closing lawful navigation routes |
| Navigation and security | Supports freedom of navigation while resisting force and unilateral restrictions | Protects commercial passage and monitors coercive activity in the Indo-Pacific | Freedom of navigation without threats to peace or coastal sovereignty |
| Economic interests | Ports, fisheries, offshore energy, research and seabed exploration | Ports, fisheries, offshore energy, tourism and mineral interests | Sustainable maritime commerce and fair access to common resources |
| Boundary disputes | Several boundaries remain to be finalised | Boundaries have been negotiated with several neighbouring states | Peaceful delimitation rather than unilateral expansion |
The differences lie chiefly in geography and immediate security calculations. Australia must secure routes near Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the Pacific, while India must manage maritime pressure in the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Shared adherence to UNCLOS nevertheless gives both countries a common legal vocabulary for addressing those pressures.
Navigation without coercion
India strongly supports freedom of navigation but has objected to coercive maritime conduct, including the use of force against foreign fishing vessels. The 2010 Gujarat High Court decision directing the MV Amphi to leave Indian waters became a prominent example of how domestic courts and international maritime law interact during a diplomatic dispute with Italy.
Australia shares an interest in navigation that remains predictable and legally grounded. Australian shipping depends on access through the Lombok and Makassar straits, while the nation’s strategic partnerships and economic ties extend across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. A broader account of these debates appears in maritime news analysis from Tato Bay News.
The practical distinction is between lawful transit and attempted coercion. UNCLOS preserves navigation rights, yet it also requires states to respect coastal jurisdiction, peaceful dispute settlement and the prohibition on threats or force. India’s objections become strongest when commercial activity is framed as a unilateral attempt to alter maritime boundaries.
Turning maritime law into practical gains
International principles become meaningful only through administration, enforcement and cooperation. India’s priorities extend from boundary delimitation to the daily protection of fishers, ports and offshore ecosystems. Australia can contribute relevant technical experience without treating maritime security as a purely military issue.
India’s maritime priorities
- Complete unresolved boundary delimitation through negotiation or lawful adjudication.
- Use vessel monitoring and licensing to protect fishers from illegal harvesting.
- Clarify environmental rules for offshore projects and continental-shelf activities.
- Coordinate port development with coastal resilience and community protections.
Australia’s practical contributions
- Share hydrographic, meteorological and fisheries-management expertise.
- Support Indian Ocean island states in surveillance, rescue and climate adaptation.
- Help finance marine spatial planning and reef-monitoring programmes.
- Connect ports, insurers and clean-energy industries with blue-economy projects.
India’s mineral exploration in the central Indian Ocean makes the seabed regime an important test of institutional fairness. Australia, with offshore industries, protected areas and established port cities, has comparable experience in turning maritime claims into sustainable economic activity.
Cooperation also needs institutional trust. Hydrographic information, rescue coordination, fisheries monitoring and transparent environmental assessments can reduce uncertainty without requiring every maritime disagreement to become a sovereignty crisis.
Australian realities and legal responsibilities
Australian experience makes the issue concrete. Sydney Harbour carries commuter ferries and tourism traffic, while Port Botany handles containers and bulk trade. Their safety and access depend on clearly defined zones, reliable charts and rules that reconcile commercial movement with protection of sensitive habitats.
Along the Great Barrier Reef, fishing and tourism operators depend on healthy water, predictable boundaries and swift enforcement against pollution. In Melbourne and Sydney food markets, shoppers encounter Australian prawns and salmon alongside imported tuna; behind those shelves sit questions about quotas, traceability, labour standards and foreign fishing pressure.
Recreational sailors and offshore clubs also need charts, rescue coordination and confidence that navigation rules apply equally to state and foreign vessels. Legally, Australia implements maritime boundary agreements through the Maritime Arrangements Act 1991, while the Australian Coastal Zone Management Act 2018 and Queensland’s Seas and Reefs Act 1978 govern important coastal and reef uses.
A practical framework for durable maritime rights
India and Australia can reinforce a rules-based maritime order through the Indian Ocean Rim Association, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the International Maritime Organization. Regional diplomacy can support negotiations, technical institutions can standardise safety and environmental protections, and judicial mechanisms can clarify disputed obligations.
The framework must remain practical. It should deter force against fishing fleets, preserve access to ports and shipping routes, protect exclusive economic zones and continental-shelf rights, and resolve overlapping claims through agreed delimitation rather than unilateral action. Marine ecosystems also require protection, since coral degradation, pollution and overfishing threaten fisheries and coastal communities across the Indo-Pacific.
The practical takeaway is to assess maritime policy by one test: whether it keeps lawful navigation open while making resource rights enforceable, boundaries peaceful and ecological damage accountable.