India’s policy on neonationalism in a world of populist movements

India does not approach neonationalism through a single official doctrine. Its response is better understood as a framework of strategic autonomy, constitutional civic nationalism, federalism, and selective diplomatic engagement. The crucial distinction is between nationalism as a democratic expression of belonging and majoritarianism as the claim that one cultural community constitutes the whole nation.

For Australians, this matters because India is both a major power and a familiar partner, while domestic debates about migration, religious freedom, foreign influence and online harm increasingly echo campaigns elsewhere. A sound Indian approach should welcome popular pressure for accountability without treating every critic of institutions as an enemy, and it should cooperate internationally without exporting a single model of national identity.

Why neonationalism differs from ordinary nationalism

Neonationalism has no single settled meaning, but it generally describes national identity as active, renewed and often threatened. It typically combines popular sovereignty, a sharply bounded people, a redemptive mission and external adversaries. Populism, by contrast, is a political style claiming to represent “the people” against institutions; it can appear on the left or right and can coexist with elections and civil liberties. The danger arises when democratic methods become means to suppress rivals.

The foundation’s visual nationalism archive offers a useful way to examine how nationalist movements are built through symbols, memory, organisation and public ritual, not merely through policies. India can draw strength from civilisational continuity while refusing the equation of cultural rootedness with political exclusion. A durable formula is shared constitutional belonging, not numerical dominance.

The Indian policy framework

At home, India’s policy is to anchor national unity in citizenship, constitutional safeguards and federal plurality rather than ethnicity alone. Linguistic states, district-level diversity and a multilingual public sphere make the civic model practical. Yet pluralism is not automatic: majoritarian pressure can rise when elections, media or institutions are treated as instruments of one community. Independent courts, credible election administration and federal representation are therefore assets of national resilience.

Externally, strategic autonomy and the tradition of non-alignment give India room to work with democracies, partners and governments that differ in ideology. New Delhi can present Indian civilisational values as a basis for dialogue, not as a licence to lecture others. The wider diplomatic aim is to consolidate a voice for the Global South while protecting sovereignty and avoiding a rigid anti-West alignment.

India has no formal “neonationalism policy,” and pretending otherwise would conceal choices. Its effective policy is selective solidarity: defend national interests, support law-based cooperation, and contest majoritarian policies without treating the people of another country as the enemy. Translating civilisational thought into public policy requires institutional restraint, especially where religious or cultural identity is used to weaken equal citizenship.

Selective engagement with populist movements

Global populist movements are not a uniform camp. Hungary, Türkiye, Brazil and other examples combine distinct political aims, and some popular mobilisation reflects real failures by established parties. India should separate legitimate demands for representation from methods that undermine pluralism, judicial independence or electoral fairness. The analytical rule is simple: judge governments by their treatment of rivals and minorities, while keeping room for social movements and cultural dialogue.

Populism also creates commercial and strategic hazards. Protectionist tariffs, arbitrary boycotts, sanctions and religious geopolitics can raise costs for Indian exports and diaspora communities. At the same time, shared concerns about corporate power, inequality and unaffordable housing give India opportunities to build coalitions. In Malaysia’s Sabah, the politics of household indebtedness show how welfare can become a vehicle for identity-based mobilisation; the discussion of Sabah household debt is a reminder that policy substance and political packaging must be assessed together.

India’s diplomatic method should therefore engage governments without rewarding coercive rhetoric. It can maintain working ties where interests overlap while reserving criticism for institutional erosion. This prevents ideological isolation and reduces the incentive for populist actors to present India as part of a hostile global bloc.

What Australia can learn from its own pressures

Australia offers a relevant comparison because its political system combines a civic national identity with visible contest over immigration, religious diversity and external influence. Sydney and Melbourne’s Little India districts, around Harris Street and Victoria Street respectively, illustrate the cultural and commercial vitality of Indian communities. The point is not to idealise frictionless coexistence, but to recognise that pluralism develops through ordinary institutions rather than slogans.

Everyday habits also shape the information environment. Many families in those cities move between English and South Asian languages in WhatsApp groups, follow diaspora news and cricket coverage, and buy staples at supermarkets as well as neighbourhood grocers. A diverse consumer market has created Indian-owned media outlets, restaurants, education providers and professional firms. These networks can enrich public debate, while making transparent scrutiny of cross-border political organising more important.

Legislation shows the balancing task. The Racial Hatred Act 1995 makes racial vilification unlawful, while state and territory laws address particular forms of hate and harm. The Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 discloses foreign principals in certain activities intended to influence Australian politics, and the Online Safety Act 2021 adds duties for digital platforms. Australia must defend equal citizenship and democratic oversight without treating cultural expression, diaspora identity or ordinary political advocacy as inherently suspicious.

A practical policy agenda

A practical Indian policy should combine a clear normative centre with flexible diplomacy. India can explain that its nationalism is civic, constitutional and compatible with civilisational diversity; then apply consistent tests to domestic and international partners. Australia’s example suggests why cultural confidence must be paired with media pluralism, transparent institutions and credible complaint mechanisms.

The following measures would make that approach concrete:

The durable democratic centre

The lesson is not to pretend that populism is alien to India or Australia. Both societies contain real grievances and democratic movements that challenge remote institutions. The relevant dividing line is between demands that enlarge representation and projects that make pluralism the first casualty of national unity.

India’s strongest response is a nationalism that can accommodate multiple communities, religions, languages and political ideas while remaining confident in its civilisational depth. Its diplomacy should use that confidence to build relationships across ideological divides rather than manufacture a permanent enemy. The durable lesson to remember is that belonging must be broad, institutions must remain independent, and sovereignty must serve diversity rather than suppress it.